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Abstract 
We  use  a  unique  dataset,  containing  individual  survey  data  from  the  English 
Longitudinal Study of Ageing linked to administrative data on earnings histories from 
administrative records, to construct measures of lifetime earnings and examine how 
these  relate  to  financial  resources  in  retirement.  Retirement  income  and  wealth  at 
retirement is, as expected, positively correlated with lifetime earnings but there is also 
substantial dispersion in retirement income and retirement wealth among people with 
similar lifetime earnings. For example, we find that those with greater numerical ability 
and higher education tend to have greater retirement resources even after controlling 
for differences in lifetime earnings. The retirement resources of single women are far 
less well explained by their own lifetime earnings than those of couples or single men. 
We hypothesise that, as the vast majority of single women in the age group considered 
had previously been married and are now widowed or divorced, this reflects the fact 
that we do not observe the lifetime earnings of their former spouses.  
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1.  Introduction 
Recent  years  have  seen  greater-than-expected  increases  in  life  expectancies  and 
weaker-than-expected  investment  returns.  Furthermore,  the  level  of  income  that  an 
individual  could  expect  to  get  from  state  pensions,  if  he  was  on  average  earnings 
throughout his working life, in proportion to his working life earnings, peaked for those 
reaching State Pension Age (SPA) in about 2000.1 Private sector employers’ provision of 
occupational pension schemes to their employees has also been declining.2 
Against this backdrop it is perhaps unsurprising that the focus of UK pension policy has 
been the adequacy – or otherwise – of working age individuals’ provision for their own 
retirement. Accurate and timely information on the level and distribution of retirement 
resources,  and  the  characteristics  of  those  who  are  at  greater  risk  of  not  making 
appropriate  retirement  saving  decisions,  are  therefore  an  important  ingredient  in 
determining which, if any, reforms might be sensible to pursue. 
This paper builds on previous work funded by the Department for Work and Pensions 
(Bozio, Crawford, Emmerson and Tetlow, 2010), which provided some of the first recent 
analyses  of  the  relationship  between  UK  individuals’  lifetime  earnings  and  their 
subsequent  retirement  income.  This  paper  presents  a  more  detailed  review  of  the 
evidence from the linkage of administrative data on earnings and survey data from the 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). 
The main difficulty in assessing the appropriateness of individual retirement provision 
comes from the need to understand the behaviour of wealth accumulation. Low wealth 
at retirement could be explained by a variety of reasons. First, it could simply represent 
a rational choice to save little during one’s lifetime: for example, due to having low 
lifetime earnings, high consumption needs or a personal preference to consume a large 
proportion of lifetime earnings during working life rather than in retirement. Second, it 
could  represent  adverse  shocks  –  to,  for  example,  health,  earnings  or  investment 
returns – reducing retirement incomes of some individuals. Third, it could be due to 
some  individuals  being  myopic  and  therefore  tending  to  spend  too  much  during 
working life and leaving them with less spending capacity than they would like during 
retirement. 
This reflects an old debate in economics on the respective influences of “choice” versus 
“chance” in wealth accumulation, and a more recent debate on whether decision makers 
                                                           
1 Assertion relates to state pension income as a share of earnings at age 50. See, for example, Bozio, Crawford 
and Tetlow (2010): Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show state pension income as a share of age 50 earnings for individuals 
earning at the level of median male earnings in each year of their working life (under pre- and post-Pensions 
Act 2007 policy). 
2 See, for example, chapter 7 of ONS (2010) and Forth and Stokes (2010).  3 
 
are “rational” or “myopic”. Milton Friedman (1953, 1957) was the first to suggest that 
the fact that saving rates are observed to increase with current income should not lead 
to the conclusion that the “rich save more”. He postulated that available evidence could 
not reject that saving rates could be constant across the permanent income distribution. 
If that were true, inequalities in ratios of lifetime wealth to lifetime earnings would 
simply reflect differences in preferences about risk taking or time preferences. More 
recently the debate has been renewed by the question on whether low rates of saving 
reflect myopic behaviour – in which case there might be a role for policy in encouraging 
greater  saving  –  or  rational  choices  –  in  which  case  there  is  likely  to  be  less  of  a 
justification  for  policy  intervention.3  The  policy  debate  focused  on  whether  tax 
incentives for retirement saving vehicles were leading to genuinely new saving or were 
simply displacing other forms of saving (Poterba et al. 1996, Engen et al. 1996). 
More recent research in the United States has renewed this debate. Using administrative 
data  on  earnings  histories  linked  with  the  Health  and  Retirement  Study  (HRS), 
researchers have analysed how wealth in retirement is associated with levels of lifetime 
earnings (Gustman and Steinmeier 1999, Venti and Wise 2000). They found that ratios 
of  retirement  wealth  to  lifetime  earnings  were  roughly  constant  across  the  lifetime 
income distribution, thus reinforcing Friedman’s view. On the other hand, using recent 
data on consumption and wealth in retirement, other researchers have come to the 
opposite conclusion – in other words, that actually the rich do save more as a share of 
their income (Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes 2004). 
In this paper we look at the wealth holdings of individuals aged 61 to 75 in England in 
2002–03 and how these relate to their lifetime earnings, using a new dataset containing 
detailed information on both these items. 4 (Section 2 provides a detailed description of 
the data and measures used.) We examine the extent to which lifetime earnings can 
explain variation in wealth holdings in early retirement and how the ratio of wealth 
holdings to lifetime earnings differs across the distribution of lifetime earnings.  
Earlier debate in the literature has been confined to the US, for lack of evidence on other 
countries. This paper extends the evidence base to England by using newly available 
information from ELSA on the lifetime earnings and a wide range of measures of current 
circumstances of a sample of older individuals living in households in England. We focus 
specifically on the cohort of individuals born between 1927 and 1941 (aged 61 to 75 in 
2002–03).  Information  on  lifetime  earnings  comes  from  National  Insurance  (NI) 
                                                           
3 How much individuals save over their lifetimes and for what purposes also has important implications for the 
appropriate treatment of savings and wealth in the tax system. We will not address those issues here; 
interested readers may wish to refer to Banks and Diamond (2010) for a discussion. 
4 In this paper, we do not attempt to explain variation in lifetime earnings. Unpredictable events, such as 
adverse health shocks, may affect the level of wealth an individual holds at retirement because they actually 
reduce the individual’s available resources by reducing their earning capacity. This is an interesting issue in its 
own right, but not one we address here. 4 
 
records, which are collected by the government in order to keep track of individual 
entitlements to certain state benefits.  
Though the level of lifetime earnings (at least for couples and single men) is strongly 
correlated with wealth holdings, we find that there is still considerable variation in the 
level of wealth holdings even among individuals (or households) with similar levels of 
lifetime earnings. Controlling for a number of other indicators of past circumstances and 
experience of “chance” events – such as, periods out of the labour market – explains 
some  of  the  additional  variation  in  wealth  holdings,  though  some  other  past 
circumstances – in particular, number of children – are found to be unrelated to wealth 
holdings, once we have controlled for lifetime earnings. We also find that controlling for 
a potential indicator of investment performance (individuals’ numeracy), an indicator of 
preferences  (educational attainment),  and expectations  of future  resource  needs (as 
measured by expectations of surviving for the next 10 to 15 years) explain some of the 
remaining variation in wealth holdings. The residual variation in wealth holdings could 
be  explained  by  unmeasured  differences  in  resources  (such  as  past  receipt  of 
inheritances and gifts, or past self-employment income), other differences in tastes for 
wealth accumulation or other shocks. Though we exclude those who are likely to have 
had  substantial  self-employment  income,  the  dataset  we  use  does  not  contain  a 
comprehensive  measure  of  gifts  and  inheritances  or  self-employment  income  so  we 
cannot definitively distinguish between unmeasured variation in other resources and 
differences in tastes. 
We do not here attempt to model explicitly the impact of shocks or decisions that could 
affect both lifetime earnings and the amount of income saved during the lifetime. For 
instance, the decision to have children might impact both the total amount of lifetime 
earnings and the savings rate of households. Other examples could include the age of 
retirement,  health  shocks,  education  level  and  numeracy.  Our  methodology  takes 
lifetime earnings as given and assesses how characteristics are associated with higher 
or lower wealth accumulation for a given level of lifetime earnings. If shocks or choices 
also  impact  lifetime  earnings,  we  cannot  identify  their  causal  effect  on  wealth 
accumulation independently from their direct impact on lifetime earnings. 
Notwithstanding  these  caveats,  our  results  are  similar  to  those  from  US  studies  by 
Gustman  and  Steinmeier  (1999)  and  Venti  and  Wise  (2000)  who  follow  a  similar 
approach to that which we use here: that is, we find relatively constant ratios of wealth 
in retirement to lifetime earnings across the lifetime earnings distribution. At the same 
time, we unveil significant dispersion of retirement resources conditional on lifetime 
earnings.  
Section 2 describes in detail the data we use and how we construct a measure of lifetime 
earnings using the administrative data. Section 3 presents some descriptive statistics of 5 
 
how  income  and  wealth  at  retirement  vary,  both  by  and  within  deciles  of  lifetime 
earnings.  Section  4  presents  multivariate  analysis  of  the  factors  associated  with 
dispersion in levels of wealth and ratios of wealth to lifetime earnings, examining other 
factors  in  addition  to  lifetime  earnings.  We  present  analysis  by  type  of  wealth, 
contrasting  the  redistribution  occurring  through  state  pension  wealth  with 
determinants of private wealth. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Data 
 
a.  The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
ELSA  is  a  biennial  longitudinal  survey  of  a  representative  sample  of  the  English 
household  population  aged  50  and  over  (plus  their  partners).  The  first  wave  was 
conducted between April 2002 and March 2003 and sampled 12,099 individuals (of 
whom 11,391 were core sample members, the remainder were individuals aged under 
50 who were the partners of core sample members) from 7,934 households. There are 
currently four waves of data available (2002–03, 2004–05, 2006–07 and 2008–09). The 
third wave of ELSA (2006–07) also included a new sample of individuals aged 50–53 
and the fourth wave (2008–09) included a refreshment sample of all ages 50–75. 
ELSA collects a wide range of information on individuals’ circumstances. This includes 
detailed  measures  of  their  financial  situation:  income  from  all  sources  (including 
earnings,  self-employment  income,  benefits  and  pensions),  non-pension  wealth 
(including  the  type  and  amount  of  financial  assets,  property,  business  assets  and 
antiques) and private pension wealth (including information on past contributions and 
details of current scheme rules). We also make use of estimates of state pension wealth 
that  have  been  calculated  using  information  from  individuals’  NI  records  (Bozio, 
Crawford, Emmerson and Tetlow 2010). Private and state pension wealth is expressed 
as the present discounted value of the future stream of pension income to which an 
individual is entitled. For further details on the calculation of private pension wealth in 
ELSA  see  Banks,  Emmerson  and  Tetlow  (2005).  ELSA  also  collects  information  on 
individuals’ physical and mental health, social participation and expectations of future 
events (such as surviving to some older age or receiving an inheritance).  
The  key  outcomes  from  ELSA  that  we  utilise  in  this  paper  are  those  relating  to 
retirement resources. Specifically, we examine retirement income5 (net of taxes)  and 
wealth (net of outstanding debts) at or near retirement (from all sources) observed in 
                                                           
5 For ease of exposition, throughout this paper we will use the term “retirement income” to refer to the total 
amount of income that the individuals we consider (namely those aged between 61 and 75 in 2002–03) had in 
2002–03. Some of these individuals may not actually consider themselves to be “retired”, and the income 
measure we describe includes any earned income that individuals may have had. 6 
 
the first wave (2002–03) of ELSA.6 We examine  only those who were born between 
1927 and 1941. The reason for choosing these  particular cohorts is discussed  in the 
next subsection. All the analysis presented in the remainder of this paper includes only 
the sample of ELSA respondents who were (or where the man in a couple was) born 
between 1927 and 1941, for whom data from NI records are available and who had had 
no more than five years in which they paid self-employed NI contributions (see below), 
and for whom measures of income and wealth are available from the ELSA data. 
Throughout this paper, individuals are classified as being either in  a couple or being 
single on the basis of their status when interviewed in 2002–03. The majority of men 
and  women  who  were  single  when  interviewed  in  2002–03  (72.1%  and  89.8%, 
respectively) had previously been in a couple but had subsequently separated, divorced 
or been widowed. 
The measure of retirement income that we use is the sum of income from all sources, 
namely: private pension income, asset income (e.g. rental income from property and 
interest on investments), earnings, self-employment income, state pension income, and 
other  state  benefits.  All  these  are  measured  net  of  taxes.  Figure  2.1  presents  the 
cumulative distribution of weekly  net retirement income (per head), from the ELSA 
data. This is computed as total net weekly income divided by the number of people in 
the family (i.e. one for singles and two for couples).  
Figure 2.1. Cumulative distribution of weekly retirement income (per head) in 
2002–03 
 
                                                           
6 We use the 2002–03 sample members and outcomes as measured in 2002–03 because, as discussed below, 
linked data from NI records are available for most of this group. It should be possible in future also to link new 
sample members from the third and fourth waves of ELSA to their NI records, where permission has been 





























Note: The measure of income shown is total net family income per adult in 2002–03. Sample is 
individuals (or couples where the man was) born between 1927 and 1941. Excludes individuals for 
whom family wealth and income could not be calculated or for whom linked NI data are not available. 
Also excludes singles and couples who had (or where either partner had) more than five years in which 
they paid class 2 (self-employment) NI contributions. Sample size = 967 couples, 308 single men, 655 
single women. 
A greater fraction of single men have higher levels of income per person than couples; 
the converse is true for single women. The median (50th percentile) weekly retirement 
income among those in couples was about £149 per person, compared with about £159 
among single men and £137 among single women. Of course, if there are returns to 
scale in households (that is, if two people do not need as much as twice the income of a 
single  person  to  maintain  the  same  standard  of  living),  then  a  couple  with  a  given 
income per head may be better off than a single person with the same income per head. 
All the results presented in Sections 3 and 4 consider couples and singles separately. 
This is partly to avoid the somewhat arbitrary nature of any attempt to account for 
returns to scale within households, but also (as is discussed below) because there is 
evidence that we may be missing an important component of the “lifetime resources” of 
singles due to the fact that we do not observe lifetime earnings of previous partners.  
The measure of wealth that we examine in this paper is total wealth, net of outstanding 
debts.  Specifically  we  include:  wealth  from  private  pensions, state pensions,  owner-
occupied  housing,  other  property,  business  assets  and  financial  assets.  Wealth  is 
measured  net  of  outstanding  secured  and  unsecured  debts.  Figure  2.2  shows  the 
cumulative distribution of total net wealth per adult for the same group of singles and 
couples as shown in Figure 2.1. The figures shown in Figure 2.2 are per adult – that is, 
total family wealth divided by two for couples, and one for singles. 
Figure 2.2. Cumulative distribution of total net wealth (per head) in 2002–03 





























(or couples where the man was) born between 1927 and 1941. Excludes individuals for whom family 
wealth and income could not be calculated or for whom linked NI data are not available. Also excludes 
singles and couples who had (or where either partner had) more than five years in which they paid class 
2 (self-employment) NI contributions. Sample size = 967 couples, 308 single men, 655 single women. 
The differences between  the  wealth distributions  for couples  and singles  are rather 
different from the comparison above of incomes. A smaller fraction of couples have low 
levels  of wealth than singles  do. Median  (50th  percentile)  wealth holdings per adult 
were about £185,000 per adult for couples, compared with about £150,000 for single 
men and £140,000 for single women. 
b.  National Insurance records 
ELSA  respondents  were  asked  for  permission  to  link  to  their  NI  records.  These 
administrative data have been gathered by the UK Government since 1948 in order to 
establish  individuals’  contribution  records  and  their  rights  to  claim  contributory 
benefits such as state pensions (see Bozio, Crawford and Tetlow (2010) for a history of 
state pensions in the UK). For the period 1948 to 1975, these data record the number of 
weeks’ contributions paid (that is, the number of weeks in which an individual earned 
above the Lower Earnings Limit (LEL)). For each year since 1975, earnings between the 
LEL  and  the  Upper  Earnings  Limit  (UEL)  have  also  been  recorded.7  Self-employed 
individuals pay a flat-rate contribution (known as class 2 contributions)  for weeks in 
which their self-employment profits are sufficiently high. 8 The NI records, therefore, 
contain information on the number of weeks of self-employment that an individual had 
during any given year , but no measure of their actual self -employment income.  We 
therefore exclude from our analysis any individuals who (or couples in which one 
individual)  had  more  than  five  years  in  which  they  paid  self -employed  NI 
contributions.9 
Among respondents to the first wave of ELSA, 79.0% ultimately gave their permission 
for a link to be made to their NI records and 71.8% have now been successfully linked. 
Among those not linked, the most common reason was that the respondent did not 
consent  to  the  link  being  done,  although  there  was  a  not  insubstantial  minority  of 
respondents who gave consent but for whom a successful match was not possible. A 
small number of individuals were never asked for permission; in most of these cases 
this was because the survey was conducted by a proxy respondent, who (for obvious 
reasons) was not asked to provide consent for the link to NI records to be done. Table 
                                                           
7 Before 1975, the NI data only reports the total number of weekly contributions made without detailing the 
years in which these contributions were made. From 1997 onwards, more detailed information on individual 
earnings above the UEL is also available from the NI records.  
8 Self-employed individuals also pay additional contributions in proportion to their profits, known as class 4 
contributions. However, the value of these is not included in the NI records. 
9 As a result we exclude 16.4% of couples from the sample of ELSA respondents for whom NI records are 
available and, respectively, 10.8% and 1.7% of single men and single women. 9 
 
2.1  describes  the  division  of  the  ELSA  wave  1  survey  respondents  into  the  various 
linkage groups. 
Detailed analysis of the degree to which the matched sample is representative of the 
overall  ELSA  sample  can  be  found  in  Section  2  of  Bozio,  Crawford,  Emmerson  and 
Tetlow (2010). They conclude that “the matched subsample is broadly representative of 
the entire ELSA sample”. However, those at very old ages and the self-employed were 
both found to be underrepresented in the matched sample (with those at older ages 
being  relatively  more  likely  not  to  be  matched  due  to  data  problems  and  the  self-
employed being relatively more likely not to consent to the matching being done). The 
under representation of these two groups is of less concern for this study: we examine 
those aged 61 to 75 (inclusive) in 2002–03 and therefore exclude the very old, and (as 
mentioned above) we exclude those with significant spells of self-employment.  
Table 2.1. Summary of success in matching ELSA sample members to National 
Insurance records  
  Frequency  Percentage 
All (Full ELSA Sample)  11,391  100.0 
     
Successfully Linked  8,177  71.8 
Not Linked  3,214  28.2 
Of Which     
Data Problems  824  7.2 
Did not give consent  2,180  19.1 
Were not asked  210  1.8 
Source: Table 2.1 of Bozio, Crawford, Emmerson and Tetlow (2010). 
 
For the purposes of this paper, we are interested in constructing a measure of total 
lifetime earnings. The NI records provide extremely detailed and accurate information 
on this that has never previously been available for the respondents to any household 
survey in Britain. However, they still do suffer from some limitations. First, earnings are 
recorded only if they were above the LEL, i.e. only if they gave rise to a liability to pay NI 
contributions. However, given the low level of the LEL, this will only marginally affect 
our estimates of lifetime earnings for most individuals. Second, prior to 1997 the NI 
data only record earnings up to the UEL. Third, the NI records only contain details of 
earnings  back  to  1975.  Since  the  focus  of  this  paper  is  individuals  aged  61  to  75 
(inclusive) in 2002–03, this means we will have earnings from age 48 for the oldest 
individuals in our sample and from age 34 for the youngest individuals in our sample. 
We now turn to describe how we address each of the last two problems in turn. 
The solid line in Figure 2.3 (measured on the left-hand axis) shows the proportion of 
our chosen sample that had earnings at or above the UEL in each year from 1976 to 
2002. This gives an indication of the extent to which the capping of earnings at the UEL 10 
 
in the NI data is a problem in each year. The dotted line shows, on the right-hand axis, 
the level of the UEL relative to average earnings in each year. In the early 1980s, the 
UEL was equal to about twice average earnings. Since then the UEL has typically been 
increased in line with the Retail Price Index (RPI) whereas earnings have, on average, 
grown  faster than this. This has led to  the  UEL falling relative  to  average earnings, 
reaching just above 1.6 times average earnings in 2002. In all years the majority of 
individuals  in  our  sample  are  unaffected  by  the  capping  at  the  UEL,  although  the 
proportion whose earnings were capped increased from about 9% in the second half of 
the 1970s to between 11% and 13% in most years of the 1990s. This increase will in 
part be due to the value of the UEL declining relative to average earnings but also due to 
the fact that many of those born between 1927 and 1941 (inclusive) – the focus of this 
study – will have seen their earnings peak in the early 1990s (when most of them will 
have been in their fifties). 
Figure 2.3. Fraction of individuals with earnings capped at the Upper Earnings 
Limit and the level of the UEL relative to average earnings: 1976 to 2002 
 
 
Note: Sample is individuals born between 1927 and 1941. Excludes individuals for whom family wealth 
and income could not be calculated from the 2002–03 ELSA data or for whom linked NI data are not 
available. Sample size = 49,940 person-year observations.  
In order to estimate earnings above the UEL, we use a multivariate regression technique 
that takes into account the fact that the variable of interest in our data – annual earnings 
– is censored at the UEL. This technique is known as a tobit regression and we use this 
to estimate how (log) earnings varies with age and its square in our data. This analysis 





































































































































































































Share of the ELSA sample at the UEL 
(left hand axis)
UEL as proportion of average earnings 
(right hand axis)11 
 
(defined based on formal qualifications).10 Previous studies using the US Health and 
Retirement Study have followed the same technique to account for similar censoring in 
US administrative data (Gustman and Steinmeier 1999, Venti and Wise 2000).  
The second stage of our estimation  is to simulate earnings in years before 1975. From 
the NI data we know how many weeks the individual made NI contributions (i.e. earned 
above the LEL) between 1948 and 1975, but we do not know what was his/her earnings 
were in those years nor when exactly he/she made the contributions. Our estimation of 
earnings prior to 1975 proceeds in three steps: 
i.  For each individual we estimate what their earnings growth would  have been in 
each year (based on their age, sex and education level) had they been in paid work. 
This is done taking average economy-wide earnings growth for each year (which are 
available  from  the  ONS)  and  then  adjusting  this  to  account  for  the  fact  that 
individuals  of  different  ages,  sexes  and  education  levels  experience,  on  average, 
different  increases  in  earnings.  This  adjustment  was  done  using  estimated 
coefficients on age and age squared from regressions using data from the Labour 
Force Survey from 1996 to 2006, split by educational qualifications and sex.11 
ii.  In order to get the level of possible earnings for each individual for each year prior to 
1975, we backcast by applying the estimates of earnings growth from step (i) to the 
earliest estimate of the level of earnings available in the NI data. So, for someone 
who has earnings observed in 1975, we use these earnings together with estimated 
earnings  growth  from  step  (i)  to  impute  potential  earnings  in  earlier  years.  If 
earnings  were  not  observed  for  an  individual  in  1975,  we  instead  use  the  first 
observation of earnings after 1975 to impute potential earnings for all years before 
1975. 
iii.  Finally, to obtain an estimate of actual earnings using the computed information on 
potential earnings from step (ii), we have made an assumption about which years 
the individual was in paid work. For men we have assumed that all contributing 
weeks between 1948 and 1975 occurred just before 1975 without any breaks. This 
is equivalent to assuming that all periods of unemployment (and other periods spent 
not in paid work) were at the start of the working life. For women we made the 
opposite assumption: i.e. we have assumed that periods of work (as captured by 
weekly NI contributions paid between 1948 and 1975) ran continuously from the 
year in which a woman left full-time education. This is equivalent to assuming that 
all  periods  of  unemployment  (and  other  periods  spent  not  in  paid  work)  were 
experienced directly prior to 1975. This seemed a more appropriate assumption for 
                                                           
10 This is a total of 27 years times 2 sexes times 3 education groups = 162 separate tobits. In order to predict 
earnings using the  estimated coefficients on age and age
2 from the tobit on log earnings, we include  an 
adjustment  –  following  equation  6.40  of  Wooldridge  (2002)  –  to  allow  for  the  change  of  focus  from  log 
earnings to earnings. 
11 We use the same methodology and same data as Disney, Emmerson and Tetlow (2009). 12 
 
women, as they are more likely to have entered the labour market immediately after 
leaving school, but then left the labour market when they had their first child.12 
(Sensitivity analysis shows that making the same assumption for women as for men 
does not affect the results significantly.) We assume that individuals did not have 
any earnings prior to 1948 unless they are among the small minority of  men and 
women who  are recorded as having made contributions to the pre -1948 old age 
pension. For these individuals we estimate earnings from  the exact date  at which 
their contributions started. 
Figure 2.4 shows average (mean) earnings for men who were in employment at each 
age based on the information in the NI records and adjusted for earnings above the UEL 
and  for  years  prior  to  1975  (as  described  above)   –  each  birth  cohort  is  shown 
separately. Similar figures for women are shown in Figure 2.5. All monetary values are 
shown  in 2002 prices (inflated using the  RPI).  The years for which data  have  been 
backcast (as described above) are shown by dotted rather than solid lines. For analysis 
of the data on earnings up to the UEL – i.e. without the adjustment for earnings above 
the UEL – see section 4 of Bozio, Crawford, Emmerson and Tetlow (2010).  
For men, in Figure 2.4, we can see that later cohorts tend to have higher earnings at a 
given age than earlier cohorts had. This reflects real economy-wide earnings growth 
over  time.  The  profile  is  generally  hump  shaped,  with  earnings  increasing  with 
experience up to the mid-fifties and then earnings decreasing through the late-fifties 
and early sixties. This decrease in mean earnings towards the end of working life could 
reflect higher earning individuals retiring earlier or perhaps also a reduction in the 
average number of hours worked as individuals get older.  
                                                           
12 Data from the ELSA life history interview suggest that the vast majority of women in this cohort (89.5%) had 
at least one child who was born alive and that these women were significantly more likely to have been in paid 
work before their first child was born than after they had had their first child. The median (mean) age of first 
births in this cohort from the ELSA life history data was found to be 24 (25.3) years old. 13 
 
Figure 2.4 Average simulated annual earnings for men in employment, by cohort 
(in 2002 prices) 
 
Note: Figures shown are mean earnings across all employed individuals. Sample is all individuals born 
between 1927 and 1941 observed in the 2002–03 wave of ELSA for whom information on family wealth 
and income in 2002–03, along with linked NI data, were available.  
Figure 2.5 Average simulated annual earnings for women in employment, by 
cohort (in 2002 prices) 
 
Note: Figures shown are mean earnings across all individuals. Sample is all individuals born between 
1927 and 1941 observed in the 2002–03 wave of ELSA for whom information  on family wealth and 
income in 2002–03, along with linked NI data were available.  
For women, the age profile is flatter. This reflects in part the less steep age-earnings 





























































































incomplete careers or to have had long periods of their life working part time. Our 
methodology relies on using annual earnings observed post 1975 – when these cohorts 
were aged 35 and over – and simulating backward their earnings using information on 
their participation in the labour market. These assumptions are more likely to be robust 
for individuals working continuously than for those who have changed their working 
pattern markedly. As a result our estimations of women’s earnings in the beginning of 
their  life  should  be  treated  with  more  caution  than  the  estimates  for  their  male 
counterparts. 
The  final  step  necessary  to  construct  the  lifetime  earnings  measure  is  to  sum  the 
earnings for each benefit unit. First, we up-rate earnings from the year in which they 
were  earned  to  2002  using  average  earnings  growth.13  Then  we  sum,  for  each 
individual, all the earnings from age 16 to 59 (inclusive). For couples, we then add the 
earnings of both partners. This is the measure of lifetime earnings used throughout the 
remainder of this report. 
Figure 2.6 presents the cumulative distribution of estimated lifetime earnings per head, 
decomposed by family type. For couples, the  combined earnings of both partners have 
been divided by two in order to compare the per capita figures with those for singles.14 
Because many high earning individuals have partners who had lower earnings than they 
did, earnings per head are less dispersed among couples than among single men. Single 
men are found, on average,  to have had  much  higher lifetime earnings than single 
women: for example, median total earnings between 1975 and 2002 for currently single 
men born between 1927 and 1941 amounted to £790,000 while for currently single 
women in the same cohort, median total earnings over this period were just £200,000.  
                                                           
13 Average earnings growth is measured using the Average Earnings Index for 1963 onwards, and using figures 
from Alford et al (1973) for adult male manufacturing wages for the period 1929 to 1962. Another possibility 
would have been to use a constant discount rate. We have used average earnings growth over the period as 
the discount rate in order to be able to express lifetime earnings in 2002 earnings terms.  
14 If there are returns to scale in households (that is, if two people do not need  twice as much income to 
maintain the same standard of living as a single person), then a couple with a given level of lifetime earnings 
per head may be better off than a single person with the same lifetime earnings. 15 
 
Figure 2.6 Cumulative distribution of estimated total lifetime earnings per head 
(measured in 2002 earnings terms) 
 
Note: Individuals born between 1927 and 1941. Lifetime earnings is the sum of earnings uprated by the 
average earnings growth.  
Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.6 draw attention to several important aspects of the distribution 
of retirement income, wealth at retirement and lifetime earnings. First, we find that 
many currently single women have had very low lifetime earnings (Figure 2.6), even 
though their retirement incomes and retirement wealth are not so dissimilar from that 
of single men (Figures 2.1 and 2.2, respectively). One likely explanation is that, since the 
vast majority of these women were previously married, while they might have had low 
earnings during their careers (as shown in Figure 2.6), they might still have  gained 
rights  to  pension  income  through  their  former  partners’  NI  contributions  and 
contributions to private pensions or inherited wealth from a deceased partner. On the 
other hand, even though the majority of currently single men have also previously been 
married, we find a less obvious discrepancy between the patterns of lifetime earnings in 
Figure 2.6 and the retirement income and retirement wealth shown in Figures 2.1 and 
2.2. This may be because currently single men from the cohorts we consider here are 
much less likely to have gained pension income through a previous marriage. In the case 
of state pensions, this reflects the fact that  men whose (former) wives reached SPA 
before 2010 gain no entitlement to additional state pension income on the basis of their 
wives’ contributions, even if these were higher than their own. In the case of private 
pensions, men in this cohort are probably less likely to have inherited rights from their 





































































































married  women  in  these  cohorts  than  married  men.15  Therefore, we would expect 
single men in this cohort to have pension income much more in line with their lifeti me 
earnings than single women. That this is indeed borne out by  our results presented in 
the next section. 
3.  Distribution and composition of retirement income and wealth by lifetime 
earnings  
If individuals want to smooth their level of consumption across their lifetimes, other 
things being equal, those who experience higher earnings during their working lives 
will tend to consume more in absolute terms during their working lives but will also 
need to accumulate a greater stock of wealth before they stop working than someone 
who had experienced lower lifetime earnings. We would also expect this greater stock 
of wealth to be reflected in a higher level of income in retirement. Thus we would 
expect, all else being equal, that those with higher lifetime earnings would have higher 
wealth (and higher retirement income) when they reach retirement. Of course, not all 
else is equal and individuals’ differing experiences (e.g. having made fortuitous 
investments or having had high consumption needs during their lives) could have led 
individuals who had very similar lifetime earnings to end up with very different levels of 
wealth and retirement income.  
This  section  starts  by  examining  how  retirement  income  and  wealth  in  retirement 
varies  by  lifetime  earnings.  This  is  explored  both  in  aggregate  and  for  different 
components of income and wealth. We also document how much variation in wealth 
and income exists between individuals with similar levels of lifetime earnings. Section 
3.1 examines those in couples, section 3.2 looks at single men and section 3.3 looks at 
single women. Section 4 looks at how much of the variation in retirement wealth and 
income – over-and-above that explained by differences in lifetime earnings – we can 
explain by other factors. 
 
 
3.1 Distribution of wealth holdings and retirement income: couples 
Figure  3.1  shows  the  average  (mean)  level  of  different  components  of  retirement 
income among couples, split by decile of lifetime earnings – that is, the “poorest” group 
are the 10% of couples with the lowest combined lifetime earnings, while the “richest” 
are the 10% of couples with the highest combined lifetime earnings. Table A.1 in the 
Appendix presents figures for the mean and median level of lifetime earnings within 
                                                           
15  Earlier  cohorts  of  married  women  working  part-time  may  also  have  been  less  likely  to  have  built  up 
occupational  pension  rights  since,  prior  to  the  European  Court  of  Justice  ruling  in  May  1995,  part-time 
employees could be excluded from their employer's pension scheme. 17 
 
each  of  the  deciles  –  in  the  5th  decile,  for  example,  both  mean  and  median  lifetime 
earnings are equal to £1.2 million. (Unlike Figure 2.1, Figure 3.1 shows the total weekly 
income  of  the  couple,  rather  than  income  per  head.)  Figure  3.1  clearly  shows  that 
average total income increases across the deciles of lifetime earnings. One exception to 
this pattern is between the poorest decile of lifetime earnings and the 2nd decile, when 
mean retirement income falls slightly. This might be due to measurement error – that is, 
some  individuals  have  erroneously  been  included  in  the  lowest  decile  of  lifetime 
earnings as a result of their lifetime earnings having been mismeasured. One possible 
way in which this could arise is if some individuals had significant self-employment 
income that is not captured in our measure of lifetime earnings (we include here those 
with up to 5 years of self-employment income). Evidence in favour of this hypothesis 
can be seen in the fact that mean current self-employment income (at £25 per week) is 
highest in the bottom decile of lifetime earnings.  
Figure 3.1. Mean retirement income, by lifetime earnings decile – couples 
 
Note: Sample size = 967; one observation per couple. Figures shown are net weekly income of the couple, 
in 2002 prices. Total income includes pension income, which is shown separately in Figure 3.2. Asset 
income includes: interest income from bank accounts, bonds, tax-favoured savings accounts and unit 
trusts; dividend income from stocks and shares; income from property. 
 
Across the rest of the distribution of lifetime earnings, average retirement income rises 
gradually between decile 2 and decile 6,16 and then rises more quickly between decile 6 
and the richest decile. Both earned income and, in particular, asset income is highest in 
                                                           
16 The decline in mean income between the 5
th and 6
th deciles is not statistically significantly different from 














































the highest deciles of lifetime earnings. Total retirement income among couples in the 
richest decile of lifetime earnings is almost twice that of couples in the 5th decile, with 
asset income being 2.8 times larger. 
Overall, higher employment income, self-employment income and asset income explains 
one-quarter  of  the  increase  in  total  income  seen  between  the  5th  decile  of  lifetime 
earnings  and  the  richest  decile.  The  remainder  of  the  difference  is  explained  by 
differences in pension income and, more specifically, private pension income, as shown 
in Figure 3.2.  
Figure 3.2. Mean state and private pension income, by lifetime earnings decile – 
couples 
 
Note: Sample size = 967; one observation per couple. 
State pension income is defined here (as in the rest of the paper) as the sum of income 
from the BSP and the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). Weekly state 
pension income is broadly flat across the lifetime earnings distribution. This suggests 
that the earnings-related component of the state pension system (which would tend to 
lead to state pension income rising with lifetime earnings decile) is being completely 
offset  by  the  greater  tendency  of  those  who  had  higher  lifetime  earnings  to  have 
contracted  out  of  this  tier  of  state  pension  provision.17  In contrast private pension 
income rises continuously and quite steeply across each decile of the lifetime  earnings 
distribution, with the increases being particularly large between the top three deciles. 
While mean state pension income in the top decile is almost the same as that of the 5 th 
                                                           










































State pension income19 
 
decile (and indeed that of all other deciles), private pension income in the top decile is 
4.3 times that of the 5th decile and 8.9 times that of the poorest decile.  
Taken  together,  Figures  3.1  and  3.2  suggest  that  lifetime  earnings  are  more  clearly 
related to some components of retirement income (private pension income and asset 
income) than others (self-employment income and state pension income). We now turn 
to examine how wealth among couples varies with lifetime earnings. 
The average level of total net wealth and wealth excluding the value of owner-occupied 
housing, by decile of lifetime earnings, is shown for couples in Figure 3.3. For both of 
these  measures  of  wealth,  the  pattern  is  extremely  similar  to  that  observed  for 
retirement income. Both are slightly higher in the lowest decile of lifetime earnings than 
the second, both then increase steadily up to the upper-middle of the distribution of 
lifetime earnings (with the exception of a slight, not statistically significant, fall in non-
housing  wealth  between  the  6th  and  7th  decile  of  lifetime  earnings)  and  then  both 
increase more quickly up to the top of the lifetime earnings distribution. Total wealth is 
found to be 2.2 times greater in the top decile of the lifetime earnings distribution than 
in  the  5th  decile,  with  non-housing  wealth  being  2.3  times  greater.  In  all  lifetime-
earnings  deciles  the  ratio  of  non-housing  wealth  to  housing  wealth  is  remarkably 
constant at roughly 7:3. 
Figure 3.3. Mean total net wealth and net non-housing wealth, by lifetime 
earnings decile – couples 
 
Note: Sample size = 967; one observation per couple. Total wealth is the sum of all financial, owner-
occupied housing, state and private pension wealth, plus the value of any other physical assets (such as 






































Non housing wealth20 
 
unsecured debts. Non-housing wealth is total net wealth, less the (net of any outstanding mortgage) value 
of owner-occupied housing. 
The variation in broad components of wealth by decile of lifetime earnings, for couples, 
is shown in Figure 3.4. State pension wealth is broadly flat across the lifetime earnings 
distribution. This is consistent with the finding in Figure 3.2 that state pension income 
is  flat  across  the  lifetime  earnings  distribution.  Private  pension  wealth  is  found  to 
increase steadily from the lowest decile of lifetime earnings up to the 7th decile, and 
then increase more sharply up to the highest decile of lifetime earnings. This is exactly 
the same pattern as is seen for private pension income.18 A similar pattern is observed 
with housing wealth.  
Figure 3.4. Mean net wealth holdings, by lifetime earnings decile – couples 
 
Note: Sample size = 967; one observation per couple. “Housing wealth” is the value of owner-occupied 
housing, less the value of any outstanding mortgage on the home. “Financial wealth” is the value of all 
financial assets, less the value of any unsecured debts. “Business and other assets” is the value of all 
business assets, non-owner-occupied property and physical assets (such as antiques), less the value of 
any loans secured on these assets. “Private (state) pension wealth” is the present discounted value of the 
expected future stream of income from any private (state) pensions to which the couple have entitlement. 
                                                           
18 The fact that both state/private pension income and state/private pension wealth are found to follow the 
same pattern with respect to lifetime earnings is not surprising but need not necessarily have been true. In 
both cases, wealth is the present discounted value of the expected future income stream. For those who have 
already started to receive all their state and private pension incomes, income and wealth will be very closely 
related to one another. However, some individuals in the cohort we are examining have not reached State 
Pension Age yet, and so will not be receiving their state pension income, while some will not yet have 
annuitised their private pension wealth. Another reason why state pension wealth and state pension income 
might differ is because the measure of state pension income shown here is that reported by the individuals in 
the ELSA survey, while state pension wealth is computed from NI records. The two might not be the same, 
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Financial wealth increases particularly sharply across the highest four deciles of lifetime 
earnings, with financial wealth of the top decile being nearly four times greater than the 
financial  wealth  of  the  6th  decile.  The  value  of  business  assets  does  not  increase 
monotonically with lifetime earnings decile, although the value of these assets in the 
highest lifetime earnings decile is significantly higher than in any other decile of lifetime 
earnings.  
The same data from Figure 3.4 are repeated in Figure 3.5, but with the decomposition 
by  earnings  decile  showing  the  share  of  wealth  held  in  each  form  rather  than  the 
absolute amount held. This shows that housing wealth makes up about 30% of the total 
wealth  of  each  decile.  Although  the  share  of  housing  wealth  is  constant  across  the 
lifetime  earnings  distribution,  whether  or  not  a  couple  has  some  housing  wealth  is 
markedly different. In Table A.3 in the appendix we report what proportion of couples 
in each quintile have no housing wealth at all. Among couples in the lowest quintile 40% 
report having no housing wealth, compared to only 2% of the top quintile.  
Wealth held in business and other assets, when measured as a share of total wealth, is 
particularly high in the lowest decile of lifetime earnings. As suggested before, this could 
be  indicative  of  some  individuals  who  had  significant  amounts  of  self-employment 
income during their lives being wrongly classified as being in the lowest earning tenth 
of the population. In all other deciles of lifetime earnings, business assets are a relatively 
small share of total wealth. Financial wealth – outside of pensions – typically increases 
as a share of wealth as lifetime earnings increase. Conversely, the percentage of wealth 
held in pensions tends to be lower for those in the higher deciles of lifetime earnings 
than for those in the lower deciles. Though the share of wealth held in private pensions 
does  increase  across the lifetime earnings deciles,  the  share  of wealth held in state 
pensions declines by more. 
   22 
 
Figure 3.5. Composition of total net wealth, by lifetime earnings decile – couples 
 
Notes: As Figure 3.4. 
The average amount of income and wealth held by individuals within each decile of 
lifetime earnings, which has been discussed so far, disguises a considerable amount of 
variation in the amount of income received and wealth held by individuals in the same 
decile of lifetime earnings. Figure 3.6 shows the 10th, 25th, 50th (median), 75th and 90th 
percentiles of total net wealth in each decile of lifetime earnings. Median wealth – and 
indeed  the  25th  and  75th  percentiles  of  wealth  –  is  found  to  increase  with  lifetime 
earnings decile.19 However, there is considerable variation in wealth holdings within 
each decile of lifetime earnings. A sizeable minority of couples who had relatively low 
levels of lifetime earnings actually  hold relatively high levels of wealth : for example, 
within each decile of lifetime earnings, the 75th percentile of total wealth is about twice 
as large as the 25th percentile. Furthermore, in the 4th decile of lifetime earnings, one-in-
four  couples  have  total  net  wealth  in  excess  of  £400,000,  while  in  the  8th  decile  of 
lifetime earnings, one-in-four couples have less than £360,000. In other words, (more 
than) 25% of those couples in the 4th decile of lifetime earnings are found to have more 
wealth than 25% of those in the 8th decile of lifetime earnings. Equivalent figures for 
housing  wealth  and  non-housing  wealth  are  shown  in  Figures  A.1  and  A.2  in  the 
Appendix, respectively. 
 
                                                           
19 Though the point estimate of the median and 75
th percentile falls between the fifth and sixth deciles, we 



















































Figure 3.6. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of total net wealth, by 
lifetime earnings decile – couples 
 
Note: As Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of weekly net income across couples within each 
decile of lifetime earnings. The overall pattern is much the same as that seen for wealth 
– median weekly income increases across the deciles of lifetime earnings but within 
each decile there is considerable dispersion in the levels of income that couples have. 
One-in-four couples in the highest decile of lifetime earnings have income below £410 
per week, while one-in-four couples in the 5th decile of lifetime earnings have income 









































Figure 3.7. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of total weekly income, by 
lifetime earnings decile – couples
 
Note: As Figure 3.1. 
3.2 Distribution of wealth holdings and retirement income: single men 
We now present the results from equivalent analysis of single men. Many men who 
were single in 2002–03 had previously been married but had since separated, divorced 
or  been  widowed:  72.1%  of  the  single  men  considered  here  had  previously  been 
married. As the sample size of singles is smaller than for couples, we present results for 
singles by quintile, rather than decile, of lifetime earnings.  
Figure  3.8  shows  average  (mean)  total  retirement  income  by  quintile  of  lifetime 
earnings. Total retirement income is found to be slightly increasing over the first four 
quintiles of lifetime earnings, and then increases sharply between the 4th quintile and 
the highest quintile of lifetime earnings. As was seen for couples, asset income increases 
relatively  sharply  over  the  top  half  of  the  lifetime  earnings  distribution,  while  self-




















































Figure 3.8. Mean retirement income, by lifetime earnings quintile – single men 
 
Note: Sample size = 308. Also see notes to Figure 3.1. 
Again as was found to be the case for those in couples, most of the increase in income 
between the middle and the top of the distribution of lifetime earnings reflects higher 
private pension income – this is shown in Figure 3.9. Average private pension income 
among single men in the richest quintile of lifetime earnings is found to be about three 
times that of those in the 3rd quintile of lifetime earnings. In contrast, state pension 
income is not found to increase monotonically with quintile of the lifetime earnings 
distribution and those in the top two quintiles enjoy only slightly more state pension 
income, on average, than those in the lowest quintile of lifetime earnings. 














































Figure 3.9. Mean state and private pension income, by lifetime earnings quintile – 
single men 
 
Note: Sample size = 308. Also see notes to Figure 3.2. 
Figure. 3.10. Mean total net wealth and non-housing wealth, by lifetime earnings 
quintile – single men 
 

















































































Non housing wealth27 
 
Total wealth is also found to be much higher in the highest lifetime earnings quintile 
than in other quintiles, with this being true of both housing wealth and non-housing 
wealth (as shown in Figure 3.10).  
These differences in total wealth holdings of single men by lifetime earnings quintile are 
decomposed further in Figure 3.11. As was the case for couples, the larger non-housing 
wealth of those at the top of the distribution of lifetime earnings distribution arises 
from greater holdings of financial assets, business assets and private pension wealth. 
The housing wealth of the highest fifth of lifetime earning single men is, on average, 
found to  be  about the same  as  the  value  of their private pension wealth. This is in 
contrast to the pattern for those in couples, where those in the highest fifth of lifetime 
earnings were found, on average, to have greater private pension wealth than housing 
wealth (Figure 3.4). State pension wealth is found to be broadly flat – or, if anything, 
declining – with quintile of lifetime earnings. This is slightly different from Figure 3.9 
which  showed  a  less  clear  pattern  of  state  pension  income  by  quintile  of  lifetime 
earnings.  
Figure 3.11.Mean net wealth holdings, by lifetime earnings quintile – single men 
 
Note: Sample size = 308. Also see notes to Figure 3.4. 
Variation in the portfolio composition by quintile of lifetime earnings is shown in Figure 
3.12. As was the case for couples, pension wealth is found to be, on average, a smaller 
share of the total wealth of those in higher lifetime earnings quintiles than those in 
lower lifetime earnings quintiles, with the increase in the average share of wealth held 
in private pensions not being sufficient to offset fully the declining share held in state 
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earnings: if anything, those with higher lifetime earnings are found to hold a larger 
share  of  their  wealth  in  housing.  Partly  this  pattern  reflects  differences  in  the 
prevalence  of  home  ownership  among  the  income  quintiles.  A  very  significant 
proportion of single men report no housing wealth at all: in the lowest earnings quintile, 
66% declare no housing wealth and even 15% of the top quintile report no housing 
wealth.  Further  evidence  on  the  prevalence  of  home  ownership  across  the  income 
quintiles is provided in Table A.3 in the Appendix.  
Figure 3.12. Composition of wealth, by lifetime earnings quintile – single men 
 
Note: Sample size = 308. Also see notes to Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.13. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of total wealth, by lifetime 



















































Note: Sample size = 308. Also see notes to Figure 3.6.  
The amount of dispersion in the distribution of wealth among single men, by quintile of 
lifetime earnings, is shown in Figure 3.13.20 The 25th, 50th (median) and 75th percentile 
of wealth holdings is found to increase across the quintiles of lifetime earnings. Within 
the 3rd (middle) lifetime earnings quintile, the 75th percentile of total wealth is 2.0 times 
the 25th percentile of total wealth. As for couples, there are not insignificant proportions 
of single men with relatively low lifetime earnings who are found to have greater wealth 
than some of those with much higher lifetime earnings. 
Figure 3.14 shows the distribution of weekly net income across single men within each 
quintile  of  lifetime earnings.  The  overall pattern  is  much  the  same  as  that  seen  for 
wealth – median weekly income increases across the quintiles of lifetime earnings but 
within each quintile there is considerable dispersion in the levels of income that single 
men  have.  One-in-four  single  men  in  the  highest  quintile  of  lifetime  earnings  have 
income below £180 per week, while one-in-four single men in the lowest quintile of 
lifetime earnings have income above that amount. 
   
                                                           
20 Similar figures showing the distribution of housing wealth and non-housing wealth within each quintile of 









































Figure 3.14. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of income, by lifetime 
earnings quintile – single men 
 
Note: Sample size = 308.  
3.3 Distribution of wealth holdings and retirement income: single women 
The vast majority of the single women considered here (89.8% of them) had previously 
been married but had since separated, divorced or been widowed. As we do not observe 
the lifetime earnings of their past partner, we miss a potentially very large share of their 
lifetime resources while we observe all their current wealth, which might reflect large 
amounts inherited from a previous partner. As Table A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix shows, 
average  lifetime  earnings  of  single  women  in  the  lower  quintiles  are  very  low  (for 
example, median lifetime earnings are just £29 among women in the lowest lifetime 
earnings  quintile)  and  certainly  much  lower  than  equivalent  figures  for  single  men. 
However, there is a small minority of single women who have never been married; 
these  women  tend  to  have  worked  and  earned  significant  amounts  during  their 
lifetimes.  The  vast  majority  of  never  married  women  appear  in  the  top  quintile  of 
lifetime earnings among single women; mean and median lifetime earnings within the 
highest quintile of lifetime earnings for single women are found to be not so dissimilar 
from those for single men (Table A.2). As a result of these concerns about the potential 
mismeasurement of the true lifetime resources of currently single women, the nature of 
the  analysis  we  can  perform  for  this  group  is  very  limited  and  we  believe  all  the 
remaining analysis presented in this section should be interpreted with caution. 
Figure 3.15 shows the variation in average (mean) total retirement income by quintile 















































the 2nd quintile of lifetime earnings than in the 1st, reflecting the decline in average self-
employment income between the first and second quintiles (though we cannot reject, at 
any standard level of statistical significance, the hypothesis that the mean income of 
these two groups is the same), but then increases with lifetime earnings. There is a 
particularly sharp increase in mean income between the 4th and the highest quintiles of 
lifetime earnings. Relatively low levels of asset income, employment income and self-
employment income are observed, on average, among women in all quintiles of lifetime 
earnings.  
Figure 3.15. Mean retirement income, by lifetime earnings quintile – single 
women 
 
Note: Sample size = 655. Also see notes to Figure 3.1. 
Mean levels of income from state and private pensions is shown in Figure 3.16. State 
pension income is found to be slightly higher in the lowest quintile of lifetime earnings 
than in the 2nd quintile (though, again, at any reasonable level of significance we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that mean state pension income is the same in the first and second 
quintiles). Across the whole distribution of lifetime earnings state pension income is 
found, on average, to be greater than private pension income. This is in contrast to the 
pattern found among couples and single men: among both of these other groups, those 
towards  the  top  of  the  lifetime  earnings  distribution  had  higher  average  receipt  of 
private pension income than state pension income. Private pension income of single 
women  is,  however,  found  to  increase  monotonically  between  the  lowest  and  the 
highest quintile of lifetime earnings, with a particularly large increase between the 4th 












































among those in the highest quintile of lifetime earnings than among those lower down 
the lifetime earnings distribution.   33 
 
Figure 3.16. Mean state and private pension income, by lifetime earnings quintile 
– single women 
 
Note: Sample size = 655. Also see notes to Figure 3.2.  
Figure 3.17. Mean total net wealth and non-housing wealth, by lifetime earnings 
quintile – single women 
 
Note: Sample size = 655. Also see notes to Figure 3.3.  
Wealth  of  single  women  is  found  to  follow  a  similar  pattern  to  that  of  retirement 












































































Non housing wealth34 
 
lifetime earnings than in the 2nd quintile, but is then found to increase across the higher 
quintiles  of  lifetime  earnings.  The  mean  level  of  non-housing  wealth  is  found  to  be 
relatively flat across most of the lifetime earnings distribution but to be considerably 
higher in the highest quintile of lifetime earnings than in the 4th quintile. 
The decomposition of wealth holdings, by lifetime earnings, of single women is shown 
in Figure 3.18. Greater wealth, on average, among those in the lowest quintile of lifetime 
earnings than those in the 2nd lifetime earnings quintile is explained by higher levels of 
private pension  wealth, housing wealth and  business assets. Higher private pension 
wealth despite  lower earnings seems likely to  be best explained  by private pension 
entitlements  having  been  inherited  from  a  previous  partner.  Across  the  rest  of  the 
lifetime  earnings  distribution,  both  housing  wealth  and  private  pension  wealth  are 
found to increase sharply with increasing quintiles of lifetime earnings.21 In contrast 
both financial wealth and state pension wealth are relatively flat across most of the 
lifetime earnings distribution, although those in the highest quintile of lifetime earnings 
are found, on average, to have greater amounts of wealth in these forms than those in 
other quintiles.22 
Figure 3.18. Mean net wealth holdings, by lifetime earnings quintile – single 
women 
 
                                                           
21 The patterns of private pension wealth shown in Figure 3.18 differ somewhat from the patterns of private 
pension income shown in Figure 3.16. While private pension income reflects only those pensions that are 
currently in payment, private pension wealth also captures the value of any pensions from which an individual 
is not yet receiving an income. This could explain the different patterns. 
22 Figures for wealth are derived from different information than figures for income shown above. In particular, 
figures for state pension income are taken from survey responses to questions about income sources, while 
figures for state pension wealth are derived from individuals’ NI records. Figures for income from a particular 





































Business and other assets
Private pension wealth
State pension wealth35 
 
Note: Sample size = 655. Also see notes to Figure 3.4.  
The same data from Figure 3.18 are repeated in Figure 3.19, but with the decomposition 
by earnings quintile showing the share of wealth held in each form rather than the 
absolute amount held. As was the case with couples, the share of wealth held in housing 
is found, on average, to be relatively invariant to lifetime earnings although the share of 
wealth held in housing by single women (about 40%) is higher than that of couples 
(about 30%). There are, however, a large share of single women who have no housing 
wealth at all: 51% in the bottom quintile against 16% in the top quintile (see Table A.3 
in the Appendix). Also similar to those in couples, those in the lowest quintile of lifetime 
earnings are found to hold a relatively large share of their wealth in business assets, 
which again could be  indicative  of a  problem of mismeasuring lifetime  earnings for 
those  with significant amounts of self-employment income. Unlike both couples  and 
single men, the proportion of wealth held in pensions is, if anything, greater at higher 
quintiles of lifetime earnings than at lower ones.  
Figure 3.19. Composition of wealth, by lifetime earnings quintile – single women 
 
Note: Sample size = 655. Also see notes to Figure 3.5.  
Among both couples and single men, significant amounts of dispersion in total wealth 
were found between individuals of comparable levels of lifetime earnings. Among single 
women we find even greater amounts of dispersion. Figure 3.20 shows the 10th, 25th, 
50th  (median),  75th  and  90th  percentiles  of  total  wealth  for  each  quintile  of  lifetime 
earnings. While median wealth increases across successively higher quintiles of lifetime 
earnings in much the same way as was found among couples and single men, there is 


















































percentile of total wealth is found to be 4.3 times the 25th percentile of total wealth. This 
compares  to  3.3  times  for  single  men  and  2.5  times  for  couples.  More  than  half  of 
individuals in the lowest quintile of the lifetime earnings distribution (or indeed any of 
the other quintiles, except the second) are found to have more wealth than the poorest 
10% of individuals in the highest lifetime earnings quintile.  
Figure 3.20. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of total wealth, by lifetime 
earnings quintile – single women 
 
Note: Sample size = 655. Also see notes to Figure 3.6.  
Figure 3.21. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of total retirement 








































Note: Sample size = 655. Also see notes to Figure 3.7.  
Figure 3.21 shows the distribution of weekly net income across single women within 
each quintile of lifetime earnings. The overall pattern is much the same as that seen for 
wealth  –  median  weekly  income  rises  slightly  across  the  distribution  of  lifetime 
earnings  but  within  each  quintile  there  is  considerable  dispersion  in  the  levels  of 
income that single women have. One-in-four single women in the highest quintile of 
lifetime earnings have income below £140 per week, while one-in-four single women in 
the lowest quintile of lifetime earnings have income above £170 per week. 
Section 4 presents multivariate analysis of the factors associated with differences in 
wealth  holdings  for  couples  and  single  men  over-and-above  those  explained  by 
differences in lifetime earnings.  
3.4 Ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings 
As mentioned in the introduction, an issue of debate in the literature has been whether 
or not it is true that those individuals with higher lifetime earnings tend to save a higher 
proportion of those incomes. Our data are not sufficient to give a precise answer to this 
question because, while differences in wealth in retirement could arise from differences 
in lifetime earnings, it is also possible that they could arise for other reasons – such as 
the effect of Government redistribution (through, for example, progressive taxation of 
income and the provision of means tested benefits to lower income households), receipt 
of gifts and inheritances or differences in the rates of return on investments achieved by 

















































With this important caveat  in mind,  Table  3.1 shows the  median  ratio  of wealth to 
lifetime  earnings  observed  in  our  data  split  by  current  family  type  and  quintile  of 
lifetime earnings.23 A figure of 0.3, for example, suggests that total net wealth at or near 
retirement is worth 30% of  total lifetime earnings.  If one compares this measure to 
previous studies in the US, one is struck by the similarities: for all households, Gustman 
and Steinmeier (1999) find median wealth to lifetime earnings of 0.30, with 0.39 for the 
top 25th percentile of lifetime earnings distribution. With our data we find a ratio of 0.32 
for all couples and 0.37 for the top 20th percentile of the lifetime earnings distribution. 
Table 3.1. Median ratio of total wealth to lifetime earnings by lifetime earnings 
quintile 
Lifetime earnings 
quintile  Couples  Single men  Single women 
Poorest  0.34  0.38  1,572.66 
2  0.27  0.18  1.30 
3  0.29  0.16  0.69 
4  0.31  0.21  0.40 
Richest  0.37  0.31  0.36 
All  0.32  0.24  0.57 
Note: Sample size = 967 couples, 307 single men, 625 single women. Those with zero lifetime earnings 
are excluded. 
Among couples we see that this measure of the ‘saving ratio’ falls between the poorest 
and the 2nd quintile of lifetime earnings and then rises across the rest of the lifetime 
earnings distribution. Since the decline between the poorest and 2nd quintile of lifetime 
earnings could be explained by measurement error (specifically, as mentioned before, 
the exclusion of some self-employment income in our measure of ‘lifetime earnings’), 
this could be taken as suggestive that savings rates might be increasing with lifetime 
earnings. However, for single men, the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings is flat across 
the middle 60% of the lifetime earnings distribution. Little can be read into the results 
for single women: the very high values of wealth as a share of lifetime earnings for those 
with low lifetime earnings suggest that the earnings of previous partners (who have 
now left the household due to death or divorce) are likely to be important, unmeasured 
determinants of current wealth. 
Table 3.2. Median ratio of annual retirement income to lifetime earnings, by 
lifetime earnings quintile and current family type 
Lifetime earnings 
quintile  Couples  Single men  Single women 
                                                           
23 To calculate these figures we have worked out the ratio of total net wealth to lifetime earnings for each 
individual (or couple) and then found the median ratio across all individuals (or couples) within each particular 
quintile of the lifetime earnings distribution. 39 
 
Poorest  0.019  0.028  237.000 
2  0.013  0.012  0.101 
3  0.012  0.010  0.038 
4  0.013  0.009  0.021 
Richest  0.014  0.011  0.014 
All  0.014  0.012  0.039 
Note: Sample size = 967 couples, 307 single men, 625 single women. Those with zero lifetime earnings 
are excluded. 
Table 3.2 presents similar figures for the median ratio of annual retirement income to 
lifetime earnings for each quintile of the lifetime earnings distribution.24 If an individual 
had worked for 40 years, a figure of 0.0 14 in Table 3.2 would indicate a replacement 
rate in retirement of average annual earnings of approximately 56% (=0.014*40). This 
would correspond to a higher net replacement rate because of the impact of income tax 
and national insurance contributions, which will reduce net income by more during 
working life when income is higher than in retirement . The patterns seen in Table 3.2 
are slightly different from those seen in Table 3.1. As in Table 3.1, the median ratio of 
retirement income to lifetime earnings is higher in the poorest quintile than in the 
second quintile for each group. This could reflect redistribution achieved through the 
tax and benefit system. However, it might also reflect mis -measurement of lifetime 
earnings for those who had significant self -employment  (or other non-employment) 
income during their lives. Unlike Table 3.1, however, there is not such a pronounced 
increase in the median ratio  among those in the higher quintiles of lifetime earnings.  
This difference may suggest that high lifetime earners have a lower fraction of their 
wealth annuitised than those lower down the lifetime earnings distribution  – in other 
words, less of the wealth they hold is reflected in their regular income streams.  
Section  4  presents  multivariate  analysis  of  the  factors  associated  with  differences 
between individuals in the ratio of wealth holdings in retirement to lifetime earnings. 
 
4.  Can we explain the dispersion in wealth that remains after controlling for 
differences in lifetime earnings? 
We have seen in the previous section that there is significant dispersion in wealth even 
between individuals of the same family type with similar levels of lifetime earnings. A 
lot of the crucial issues relating to savings and wealth accumulation over the life cycle, 
mentioned  in  the  introduction,  depend  on  what  explains  these  variations.  Do  they 
reflect bad planning, myopia, different consumption needs earlier in life, expectations of 
dying  young,  or  something  else?  We  cannot  definitively  distinguish  between  all  the 
possible  explanations.  However,  in  this  section  we  present  further  analysis  of  how 
                                                           
24 The measure of retirement income used here is the annualised equivalent of the weekly retirement income 
figures shown in Figures 3.1, 3.8 and 3.15. 40 
 
current and past circumstances and expectations in early retirement relate to wealth 
holdings at retirement, after controlling for differences in lifetime earnings. 
Our  methodology  rests  on  using  information  from  ELSA  respondents  (collected  in 
2002–03) to assess how much of the distribution of wealth (and the ratio of wealth to 
lifetime  earnings),  conditioned  on  lifetime  earnings,  can  be  explained.  It  is  worth 
mentioning at the outset that lifetime earnings do not represent all the resources that 
may  have  been  available  to  a  family  over  their  lifetime.  Two  important  forms  of 
resources (that could potentially have been significant for some families) are missing 
from the NI dataset: first,  any self-employment or business income  will be  left out; 
second,  we  do not  observe  any information  on  the  amounts of  gifts  or inheritances 
previously received by survey respondents. We have excluded from our analysis any 
individuals who had more than five years in which they were self-employed; this should 
have removed many of those whose lifetime resources are heavily influenced by self-
employment  income,  but  some  may  still  remain.  However,  a  low  level  of  lifetime 
employment income among our sample could still be consistent with holding significant 
wealth in retirement if this wealth had been inherited.  
Our measure of lifetime earnings, although much more precise than what has previously 
been  available,  is  not devoid  of  measurement  errors.  As  mentioned  in  the  previous 
section, we do not have information on the lifetime earnings of past partners and we are 
therefore likely to miss a large share of the lifetime resources of separated, divorced 
and widowed women. In addition, the lack of information on earnings above the UEL or 
earnings  below  the  LEL  leads  to  increased  measurement  error,  particularly  in  the 
lowest and highest parts of the lifetime earnings distribution. Given that characteristics 
that  are  likely  to  affect  the  amount  of  wealth  accumulation  (conditional  on  lifetime 
earnings) are also likely to affect the probability of having had earnings above the UEL – 
such as having a long planning horizon – we have decided to exclude from our analysis 
in this section individuals in the top and bottom 10% of our estimated lifetime earnings 
distribution. Our results cannot be generalised to the poorest and richest of households 
but have therefore a greater robustness for the middle 80% of the population. 
As mentioned in the introduction, it is worth recalling that we do not model the direct 
impact  of  characteristics  (shocks  or  choices)  on  lifetime  earnings.  Instead  we  take 
lifetime  earnings  as  given  and  we  assess  how  much,  after  conditioning  on  lifetime 
earnings, specific characteristics can explain differences in wealth accumulation. Even if 
we find no significant effect of a given variable, it could still be that the impact of this 
characteristic is directly to influence the level of lifetime earnings, rather than to affect 
the proportion of lifetime earnings that are saved.  
We run two types of regressions. First, we use median regression methods with the 
level of net wealth as the dependent variable and a number of explanatory variables, 41 
 
which include lifetime earnings. This specification gives a sense of how much wealth 
accumulation can be related to lifetime earnings and to other characteristics. Second, 
we  use  OLS  regressions  with  the  ratio  of  net  wealth  to  lifetime  earnings  as  the 
dependent variable and similar explanatory variables to those used in the regressions of 
the level of wealth. In this specification, the dependent variable can be interpreted as 
being similar to a measure of the saving rate, though it incorporates not only active 
saving from earnings but also measures unearned income (such as investment returns 
and  inherited  wealth)  that  has  been  accumulated.  We  run  each  of  these  types  of 
regressions for each type of family unit separately. We control for family composition 
(previous marital status and number of own children living either in or outside the 
household),  region,  educational  qualifications,  housing  tenure  type,  an  indicator  of 
health (whether self-report being in fair or poor health), expectations of longevity25, 
cognitive ability (measured numerical ability), NI contribution choices (whether paid 
reduced rate for married women,  whether  contracted out) and measures o f career 
breaks (years credited for spells of non employment) . As in Section 3, we define total 
net wealth as the sum of net financial wealth, net physical wealth (including housing 
wealth), private pension wealth and state pension wealth. Determinants to  total net 
wealth might be the saving rate or investment returns as well as the degree of state 
redistribution (through state pensions or taxation). Later w e  also consider different 
types of wealth separately.  
The regression results for median total net wealth  of couples are shown in Table 4.1. 
Unsurprisingly, we find that higher lifetime earnings are associated with higher wealth: 
a £1,000 increase in lifetime earnings is found to increase total net wealth by an average 
of £253. However, the adjusted R2 for the regression shown here (including lifetime 
earnings, age and other characteristics) is 35%, compared with an adjusted R2 of just 
19% for a regression including only lifetime earnings and no other characteristics (not 
reported here). In other words, a large amount of the variation in wealth is explained by 
factors other than lifetime earnings.  
Table 4.1 Regression of total net wealth or the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings 
on lifetime earnings and other characteristics: couples 
  (1)  (2) 
Total wealth  Ratio of wealth to 
lifetime earnings 
Lifetime earnings  0.253***  –0.00596* 
  (0.0273)  (0.00245) 
Age of the male  –10.39***  –0.00956*** 
                                                           
25 The indicator of expected longevity used is whether the respondent reported at least a 75% chance of living 
to some older age. The age that people were asked about depended on their age at interview but was typically 
10 to 15 years older than their current age. Specifically, those aged 65 or under were asked the chances of 
living to 75, those aged 66 to 69 were asked about age 80, and those aged 70 to 74 were asked about age 85. 42 
 
  (1.992)  (0.00180) 
Age of the female  –4.696**  –0.00417** 
  (1.430)  (0.00129) 
Proportion of lifetime earnings earned by man  204.4***  0.159** 
  (55.13)  (0.0502) 
No children  31.23  0.0122 
  (26.59)  (0.0248) 
More than 3 children  5.261  –0.00497 
  (12.78)  (0.0116) 
Own occupier   58.89***  0.0830*** 
  (16.20)  (0.0147) 
Own occupier in London or South-East  53.40  0.0450 
  (30.42)  (0.0274) 
Living in London or South-East  17.80  0.0251 
  (25.18)  (0.0227) 
Some class 2 contributions  –14.28  –0.0305 
  (19.94)  (0.0179) 
Remarried male  –57.30*  –0.0479 
  (27.27)  (0.0245) 
Remarried female  2.809  0.00589 
  (26.64)  (0.0239) 
Male with qualification above A-level   97.31***  0.0802*** 
  (15.94)  (0.0145) 
Female with qualification above A-level  94.97***  0.0871*** 
  (19.99)  (0.0181) 
Male in fair/poor health  –1.889  –0.0183 
  (14.30)  (0.0130) 
Female in fair/poor health  –28.41  –0.0256 
  (14.86)  (0.0135) 
Male with >=75% chance of living for 10 to 15 years  –1.493  –0.00598 
  (13.77)  (0.0125) 
Female with >=75% chance of living for 10 to 15 
years 
2.574  0.00508 
  (12.73)  (0.0115) 
Male with high numeracy  48.79***  0.0439*** 
  (12.69)  (0.0114) 
Female with high numeracy  38.93**  0.0347** 
  (14.14)  (0.0127) 
Whether female has paid reduced rate  –25.31  –0.0428*** 
  (13.46)  (0.0122) 
Whether contracted out (female)  22.35  0.00573 
  (14.85)  (0.0134) 
Whether contracted out (male)  16.65  –0.00484 
  (15.88)  (0.0143) 
With credits between 16 and 49 (female)  –12.36  –0.0345* 
  (18.12)  (0.0165) 
With credits between 50 and 59 (female)  –30.89*  –0.0301* 43 
 
  (15.64)  (0.0142) 
With credits between 16 and 49 (male)  –23.21  –0.0152 
  (15.82)  (0.0143) 
With credits between 50 and 59 (male)  –17.16  –0.0149 
  (12.45)  (0.0112) 
N  774  774 
adj. R2  0.35  0.60 
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
Notes: In specification (1), the dependant variable is total net wealth and the estimator is a median 
regression. Lifetime earnings and total wealth are expressed in thousand pounds. In specification (2), the 
dependant variable is the ratio of total net wealth over lifetime earnings and the estimation is done using 
OLS. The sample excludes couples in the lowest and highest decile of the lifetime earnings distribution as 
well as those with more than 5 years of Class 2 NI contributions. 
Older couples are found to have lower levels of wealth – this is not surprising given that 
our sample is aged up to 75 and the older members may have started to spend their 
previously accumulated wealth. Those who are owner-occupiers are found, on average, 
to have £59,000 more wealth in retirement, perhaps suggesting that this group did, ex-
post, particularly  well  out  of  investment  returns  over  their  lifetimes.  Those  couples 
where the man was the only earner are found to have much higher levels of wealth than 
those where the woman earned a larger share of lifetime earnings. One explanation 
consistent with this is that one-earner couples have greater scope for home production 
and therefore lower financial costs during working life. 
Those couples where the man or the woman hold high level educational qualifications 
are found to have higher levels of wealth: couples in which the man has a qualification 
higher than A-level have, on average, £97,000 more wealth than otherwise identical 
couples in which the man is educated to a lower level (the equivalent figure for women 
in couples is £95,000). This could be because patient individuals (that is, those who do 
not discount the future very heavily) are both more likely to save and also more likely to 
remain  in  education  for  longer;  or  it  could  reflect  a  causal  impact  of  education  on 
decisions over how much, and in what form, to save. 
We  find that higher levels  of numeracy are associated with higher levels  of wealth: 
couples in which the man has high numeracy26 have, on average £49,000 more wealth 
than couples in which the man has lower numeracy,  while the woman having high 
numeracy is associated with  £39,000 more wealth, on average. This is an extremely 
large coefficient given that it is conditional on both the level of lifetime earnings and 
                                                           
26 Numeracy is measured based on answers to a series of increasingly difficult mathematical questions of the 
type that might be used in everyday life (such as calculating change from a purchase in a shop through to 
calculating compound interest on money held in a bank account). Those who managed to answer most of the 
questions correctly are defined as having high numeracy – 47% of men in couples from the sample fall into this 
category and respectively 23% of women in couples, 38% of single men and 23% of single women. 44 
 
also the formal educational qualifications of both members of the couple.27 This could 
be a causal effect   –  in  other  words,  higher  levels  of  numeracy  lead  to  individuals 
choosing to save more (because they are better able to plan for retirement and, on 
average, better planning might mean more rather than less saving) or making better 
investment  choices.  Alternatively,  there  could  be  a  third  factor  –  such  as  greater 
patience (that is, a tendency not to discount the future very heavily) – that explains both 
greater numeracy and higher wealth. However, to reiterate, this finding is conditional 
on both lifetime earnings and formal educational qualifications, which makes the causal 
story more plausible.  
There are no large relationships between indicators of the choices individuals had made 
about their NI contributions (such as whether women paid the reduced rate or whether 
individuals contracted out of the state second tier pension) and the total net wealth of 
the couples. There is some mild evidence that those who have gained credits for periods 
out of the labour market (likely mainly to be due to unemployment or disability spells) 
have  lower  net  wealth  but  the  coefficients  are  not  statistically  significant  at 
conventional  levels.  Current  health  status  is  not  in  itself  found  to  be  statistically 
significantly related to wealth in retirement. 
In the second specification shown in Table 4.1, the ratio of total net wealth to lifetime 
earnings is regressed on lifetime earnings and other characteristics. The coefficient on 
lifetime  earnings  in  the  first  row  can  be  interpreted  as  the  change  in  this  ratio,  in 
percentage points, associated with a £100,000 change in lifetime earnings. The negative 
coefficient on lifetime earnings means that the ratio of total wealth to lifetime earnings 
is  slightly decreasing  over the  middle  80% of the  lifetime earnings distribution  (i.e. 
excluding the lowest and highest income deciles). However, the coefficient is very small 
and not statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level, meaning that this 
can be interpreted as a constant average ratio of total wealth to lifetime earnings for the 
middle of the income distribution. This result is consistent with similar analyses using 
data from the US (Gustman and Steinmeier 1999, Venti and Wise 2000). Although these 
studies do not formally test the relationship between the ratio of wealth to lifetime 
earnings and lifetime earnings, they present descriptive evidence that point to a similar 
result for the middle of the lifetime earnings distribution. 
Equivalent results for single men are shown in Table 4.2. For this group, less of the 
variation in wealth is explained by the observed characteristics that we allow for than it 
is for couples. Though, again as for couples, the adjusted R2 is much larger once we 
control for other characteristics in addition to lifetime earnings and age. Total wealth is 
found  to  increase  with  lifetime  earnings  –  a  £1,000  increase  in  lifetime  earnings 
                                                           
27 This is, however, consistent with earlier results from Banks and Oldfield (2007), who found that numerical 
ability was strongly correlated with measures of retirement saving and investment portfolios, even after 
controlling for other dimensions of cognitive ability.  45 
 
increases wealth by £149 – and to be lower for older individuals than for younger ones. 
Being an owner-occupier is also strongly correlated with wealth. As for couples, we find 
that  holding  higher  qualifications  is  associated  with  higher  wealth:  single  men  with 
higher qualifications have, on average, £40,000 more wealth than less qualified single 
men. As for couples, there is some mild evidence that receipts of credits at older ages is 
associated with lower total net wealth for single men. 
Table 4.2 Regression of total net wealth or the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings 
on lifetime earnings and other characteristics: single men 
  (1)  (2) 
Total net wealth  Ratio of wealth to 
lifetime earnings 
Lifetime earnings  0.149***  –0.0263*** 
  (0.0355)  (0.00653) 
Age  –8.071***  –0.00987*** 
  (1.564)  (0.00288) 
No children  18.48  0.00543 
  (22.17)  (0.0413) 
Own occupier  61.03***  0.0892** 
  (15.49)  (0.0285) 
Own occupier in London or South East  146.0***  0.213*** 
  (33.17)  (0.0606) 
In London or SE  –38.02  –0.0126 
  (24.59)  (0.0445) 
Some class 2 contributions  13.48  0.0442 
  (22.41)  (0.0410) 
Divorced  11.68  0.0167 
  (24.03)  (0.0445) 
Widowed  –4.094  –0.0262 
  (25.40)  (0.0470) 
With qualification above A-level  40.11*  0.0946** 
  (18.98)  (0.0351) 
In fair/poor health  1.957  –0.0252 
  (15.04)  (0.0276) 
>=75% chance living for 10 to 15 years  9.096  0.0195 
  (14.99)  (0.0273) 
With high numeracy  20.60  0.0603* 
  (14.22)  (0.0261) 
With credits between 16 and 49  –13.80  –0.0436 
  (16.03)  (0.0295) 
With credits between 50 and 59  –32.67*  –0.0422 
  (15.04)  (0.0275) 
Whether contracted out  3.745  0.0507 
  (15.73)  (0.0289) 
N  247  247 
adj. R2  0.32  0.29 
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
Notes: In specification (1), the dependant variable is total net wealth and the estimator is a median 
regression. Lifetime earnings and total wealth are expressed in thousand pounds. In specification (2), the 46 
 
dependant variable is the ratio of total net wealth over lifetime earnings and the estimation is done using 
OLS. The sample excludes single men in the lowest and highest decile of lifetime earnings distribution as 
well as those with more than 5 years of class 2 NI contributions. 
 
Due to the concerns, expressed above, about the robustness of the measures of lifetime 
earnings for single women, we do not present in the main text any regression results for 
this group. These are included in Appendix Table A.6 for reference. 
Table 4.3 Median regression of types of wealth on lifetime earnings and other 
characteristics: couples 








Lifetime earnings  –0.00448  0.127***  0.254*** 
  (0.00372)  (0.0115)  (0.0303) 
Age of the male  –3.630***  –3.818***  –7.539*** 
  (0.273)  (0.851)  (2.193) 
Age of the female  –1.791***  –1.530*  –1.853 
  (0.196)  (0.602)  (1.566) 
Proportion of lifetime earnings earned by 
man 
–3.182  82.35***  218.7*** 
  (7.584)  (23.76)  (61.12) 
No children  –4.996  6.813  31.51 
  (3.686)  (11.71)  (29.77) 
More than 3 children  –2.074  2.328  5.179 
  (1.753)  (5.419)  (14.21) 
Own occupier   0.406  8.584  68.77*** 
  (2.220)  (6.926)  (17.93) 
Own occupier in London or South-East  2.433  16.05  49.20 
  (4.159)  (12.82)  (33.81) 
Living in London or South-East  2.049  –8.226  28.57 
  (3.433)  (10.57)  (28.01) 
Some class 2 contributions  0.540  –20.10*  –29.09 
  (2.715)  (8.355)  (21.99) 
Remarried male  0.475  –15.26  –48.96 
  (3.729)  (11.40)  (29.87) 
Remarried female  1.398  –4.442  2.577 
  (3.640)  (11.15)  (28.99) 
Male with qualification above A-level   4.304  42.23***  96.51*** 
  (2.207)  (6.823)  (18.02) 
Female with qualification above A-level  –0.227  57.47***  116.6*** 
  (2.772)  (8.377)  (22.30) 
Male in fair/poor health  –0.139  6.855  –1.470 
  (1.964)  (6.132)  (16.02) 47 
 
Female in fair/poor health  1.764  –11.33  –30.43 
  (2.034)  (6.305)  (16.38) 
Male with >=75% chance of living for 10 to 
15 years 
2.168  –1.475  –8.247 
  (1.905)  (5.877)  (15.52) 
Female with >=75% chance of living for 10 
to 15 years 
–4.311*  6.801  6.316 
  (1.728)  (5.425)  (14.19) 
Male with high numeracy  –0.0830  12.95*  45.18** 
  (1.727)  (5.388)  (14.09) 
Female with high numeracy  –3.170  6.050  35.89* 
  (1.925)  (5.948)  (15.62) 
Whether female has paid reduced rate  –8.541***  –4.934  –13.44 
  (1.843)  (5.722)  (14.93) 
Whether contracted out (female)  0.587  16.09*  19.88 
  (2.034)  (6.340)  (16.53) 
Whether contracted out (male)  –11.93***  43.20***  28.63 
  (2.185)  (6.735)  (17.44) 
With credits between 16 and 49 (female)  –0.324  –5.326  –4.406 
  (2.510)  (7.808)  (20.28) 
With credits between 50 and 59 (female)  2.672  –16.27*  –43.76* 
  (2.130)  (6.659)  (17.33) 
With credits between 16 and 49 (male)  2.531  –19.43**  –32.74 
  (2.170)  (6.724)  (17.64) 
With credits between 50 and 59 (male)  –4.918**  –3.273  –12.50 
  (1.700)  (5.302)  (13.88) 
N  774  774  774 
Adj. R2  0.33  0.30  0.33 
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
Notes: Private wealth is total net wealth excluding state pension wealth. Lifetime earnings and wealth 
measures are expressed in thousand pounds. The sample excludes couples in the lowest and highest 
decile of lifetime earnings distribution as well as those with more than 5 years of class 2 NI contributions. 
In Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, we present the results for couples of similar regressions to 
those shown in Table 4.1, but distinguishing between different types of wealth. Table 
4.3 reproduces results using specification (1) – i.e. median regression of level of wealth 
on lifetime earnings and other characteristics – while Table 4.4 presents the results 
obtained  using  the  second  specification,  looking  at  the  ratio  of  wealth  to  lifetime 
earnings. In both cases, we present results separately for: state pension wealth, private 
pension wealth and then total private wealth (defined as total net wealth minus state 
pension wealth). 
State pension wealth is negatively related to lifetime earnings. This is not surprising, as 
the system has a redistributive component. Meanwhile private pension wealth and total 
private  wealth  are  strongly  positively  correlated  with  lifetime  earnings.  Almost  no 
characteristic is a significant determinant of state pension wealth apart from age of the 
members of the household, reflecting in large part the state pension rules. This can be 48 
 
contrasted with the regressions for private pension wealth and total private wealth. An 
increase of £1,000 of lifetime earnings is associated with a £254 increase in total private 
wealth and a £127 increase in private pension wealth. Being an owner occupier is only 
significantly positively related to wealth holdings when looking at total private wealth, 
and not when looking only at private pension wealth. This is reassuring evidence that 
this characteristic is not simply picking unobserved preferences that could impact on 
other types of wealth. The fact that households with some class 2 NI contributions have 
lower private pension wealth but not lower other private wealth is similarly consistent 
with our priors. High numeracy among both men and women is associated with higher 
total private wealth but private pension wealth is less strongly related to the numeracy 
of men and not at all significantly to that of women. This could be explained if higher 
numeracy levels, controlling for lifetime earnings, mostly affect one’s ability to make 
better  investment  decisions,  which  might  affect  total  private  wealth  holdings  in 
retirement, while private pension wealth  – which, for this cohort, largely comprises 
defined  benefit  pensions  –  was  not  as  influenced  by  individuals’  ability  to  make 
relatively sophisticated investment decisions.  
We also find that choices about the level of NI contributions that individuals have made 
have an impact on the distribution of total wealth. Couples where the wife has paid the 
married women’s reduced rate have lower state pension (£8,500 lower) wealth than 
couples where the woman did not but there is no overall difference between these two 
groups in terms of private wealth. Couples where the husband contracted out of the 
second tier state pension have lower state pension wealth – £12,000 lower on average –
but they also have more private pension wealth – £43,000 – than those who remained 
contracted in. This suggests that, as expected, contracting out led to a shift from state 
pension entitlements to private pension entitlements.  
The relationship shown in Table 4.3 between the retirement wealth and having received 
credits for periods out of work suggests there  is  some  evidence that the  pattern  of 
earnings throughout working life has some impact on wealth, over and above the direct 
impact through the overall level of lifetime earnings. Even after controlling for total 
lifetime earnings, private pension wealth is found to be lower for those who have had 
credit periods than those who have not. Interpreting these coefficients is complicated by 
the fact that credits can have been received for a number of different reasons (and not 
only  unemployment  or  disability  spells),  so  these  variables  might  confound  several 
effects. However, they do suggest that for those who have had shocks in their earnings 
histories, these shocks might have led to lower wealth accumulation not only because 
their earnings turned out to be lower than expected but also because they might have 
had to deplete their savings (or reduced their planned savings) as a result of these 
shocks. 49 
 
Table  4.4  presents  similar  results  using  ratio  of  wealth  to  lifetime  earnings  as  the 
dependent variable. The ratio of state pension wealth to lifetime earnings is negatively 
related to lifetime earnings, which reflects the redistributive structure of state pensions. 
In contrast, private pension wealth is positively correlated with lifetime earnings; in 
other words, richer households tend to accumulate more wealth through their private 
pensions than poorer households – excluding again the poorest and richest. This could 
be for a number of reasons. First, higher earners tend to be more likely to be offered an 
occupational  pension  than  lower  earners.  Second,  those  who  experience  rapid  pay 
growth (who will typically have higher lifetime earnings) accrue pensions through final 
salary  defined  benefit  schemes  that  are  worth  far  more  as  a  share  of  their  career 
average earnings than those who experience lower pay growth (who will typically have 
lower  lifetime  earnings).  Although  the  prevalence  of  final  salary  DB  pensions  has 
declined  (at  least  in  the  private  sector)  in  recent  years,  such  pensions  are  quite 
widespread among the cohort considered here. 
The coefficient on lifetime earnings is not significant in the regression for the ratio of 
total private wealth to lifetime earnings. Both having higher levels of qualifications and 
higher numeracy are associated with having a higher ratio of total private wealth to 
lifetime earnings, conditional on lifetime earnings, illustrating the importance of these 
characteristics.  The  specification  shown  in  Table  4.4  explains  a  large  part  of  the 
variation in wealth holdings relative to lifetime earnings: between 28.4% in the case of 
private pension wealth and 58.3% in the case of state pension wealth. The remaining 
variation could be explained either by differences in preferences between individuals or 
other differences in circumstances not captured by our regressors – in particular, we 
have not been able to include a measure of inherited wealth or gifts received in the past. 
Table 4.4 Regression of ratios of types of wealth over lifetime earnings on lifetime 
earnings and other characteristics: couples 







Lifetime earnings  –0.00852***  0.00385**  0.00255 
  (0.000465)  (0.00122)  (0.00243) 
Age of the male  –0.00337***  –0.00378***  –0.00618*** 
  (0.000341)  (0.000895)  (0.00178) 
Age of the female  –0.00180***  –0.00158*  –0.00238 
  (0.000245)  (0.000643)  (0.00128) 
Proportion of lifetime earnings 
earned by man 
–0.00729  0.0776**  0.166*** 
  (0.00952)  (0.0250)  (0.0498) 
No children  0.00102  0.0161  0.0112 
  (0.00469)  (0.0123)  (0.0246) 
More than 3 children  –0.00560*  –0.000994  0.000635 50 
 
  (0.00219)  (0.00575)  (0.0115) 
Own occupier   –0.00355  0.0136  0.0866*** 
  (0.00278)  (0.00731)  (0.0146) 
Own occupier in London or 
South-East 
0.00232  0.00465  0.0426 
  (0.00520)  (0.0137)  (0.0272) 
Living in London or South-East  0.000285  –0.0107  0.0248 
  (0.00430)  (0.0113)  (0.0225) 
Some class 2 contributions  0.000499  –0.0177*  –0.0310 
  (0.00340)  (0.00892)  (0.0178) 
Remarried male  –0.00234  –0.0101  –0.0456 
  (0.00465)  (0.0122)  (0.0243) 
Remarried female  0.00497  0.00216  0.000918 
  (0.00453)  (0.0119)  (0.0237) 
Male with qualification above A-
level  
0.00789**  0.0265***  0.0723*** 
  (0.00274)  (0.00720)  (0.0143) 
Female with qualification above 
A-level 
–0.0000899  0.0323***  0.0872*** 
  (0.00343)  (0.00900)  (0.0179) 
Male in fair/poor health  –0.000773  –0.00240  –0.0175 
  (0.00247)  (0.00649)  (0.0129) 
Female in fair/poor health  0.00472  –0.00623  –0.0303* 
  (0.00255)  (0.00670)  (0.0134) 
Male with >=75% chance of 
living for 10 to 15 years 
0.00462  –0.00414  –0.0106 
  (0.00237)  (0.00622)  (0.0124) 
Female with >=75% chance of 
living for 10 to 15 years 
–0.00204  0.00822  0.00712 
  (0.00217)  (0.00571)  (0.0114) 
Male with high numeracy  0.00116  0.0201***  0.0427*** 
  (0.00216)  (0.00568)  (0.0113) 
Female with high numeracy  –0.00187  0.00378  0.0366** 
  (0.00241)  (0.00632)  (0.0126) 
Female number of years with 
reduced rate 
–0.00974***  –0.00399  –0.0330** 
  (0.00231)  (0.00606)  (0.0121) 
Whether contracted out (female)  0.000814  0.00733  0.00491 
  (0.00255)  (0.00669)  (0.0133) 
Whether contracted out (male)  –0.0145***  0.0339***  0.00966 
  (0.00270)  (0.00710)  (0.0142) 
With credits between 16 and 49 
(female) 
–0.00504  –0.0125  –0.0294 
  (0.00313)  (0.00823)  (0.0164) 
With credits between 50 and 59 
(female) 
0.00177  –0.0127  –0.0319* 
  (0.00268)  (0.00705)  (0.0141) 51 
 
With credits between 16 and 49 
(male) 
0.00213  –0.0195**  –0.0173 
  (0.00271)  (0.00711)  (0.0142) 
With credits between 50 and 59 
(male) 
–0.00425*  –0.00466  –0.0107 
  (0.00213)  (0.00560)  (0.0112) 
N  774  774  774 
adj. R2  0.583  0.284  0.355 
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
Notes: The sample excludes couples in the lowest and highest decile of lifetime earnings distribution as 
well as those with more than 5 years of class 2 NI contributions. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  use  a  unique  dataset,  containing  individual  survey  data  from  the 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) linked to data on earnings histories from 
administrative records, to construct measures of lifetime earnings and examine how 
these  relate  to  financial  resources  in  retirement.  Retirement  income  and  wealth  at 
retirement are, as expected, positively correlated with lifetime earnings but there is also 
substantial dispersion in retirement income and retirement wealth among people with 
very similar lifetime earnings. For example, we find that greater numerical ability and 
higher educational qualifications are positively correlated with retirement resources 
even after controlling for differences in lifetime earnings. These correlations come in 
large part through private non-pension wealth, suggesting that decisions about how to 
invest in housing or financial wealth are impacted by higher numeracy. We also find a 
very significant impact of being an owner occupier on total private wealth. 
The retirement resources  of single  women are far less  well explained by their own 
lifetime earnings than those of couples or single men. We hypothesise that, as the vast 
majority of single women in the age group considered had previously been married, this 
reflects the fact that we do not observe the lifetime earnings of their former spouses.  
Finally we find evidence that – excluding the richest and poorest – the ratio of total 
wealth to lifetime earnings is on average relatively constant across the lifetime earnings 
distribution, suggesting that “the rich” do not save more. Our findings are qualitatively 
consistent  with  previous  findings  from  similar  studies  in  the  US  (Gustman  and 
Steinmeier 1999, Venti and Wise 2000). However, we have included a slightly different 
set of regressors and have not been able to control for some factors that were included 
in  earlier  US  studies,  making  a  direct  comparison  between  the  results  difficult.  In 
particular, we have not been able to include a measure of past receipt of inheritances or 
gifts, which might have affected total lifetime resources. The residual variation in wealth 
holdings not explained by the regression specifications presented in section 4 could be 
explained  by  a  number  of  other  unobserved  differences,  in  particular:  preferences, 
previous  receipt  of  inheritances  or  gifts,  and  different  success  with  investment 52 
 
strategies. As we have conducted most of our analysis only on the middle 80% of the 
distribution of lifetime earnings, we cannot extrapolate our results to the very lowest 
and very highest lifetime earning individuals; it is also possible that the pattern seen 
among these groups could be markedly different.    53 
 
Appendix 
Table A.1 Mean and median lifetime earnings by decile of lifetime earnings 
  Couples  Single men  Single women 
Deciles  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Poorest  415,923    446,469    [116,768]    [93,857]    7    4  
2   791,266    790,004    [411,332]    [423,644]    3,716    71  
3   951,940    954,530    [557,777]    [550,384]    42,197    38,779  
4   1,069,124    1,072,914    [658,809]    [657,686]    100,595    100,298  
5   1,164,709    1,161,857    [753,526]    [757,213]    164,900    170,001  
6   1,254,056    1,252,505    [821,287]    [806,775]    234,770    233,242  
7   1,370,829    1,372,170    [908,778]    [912,816]    315,057    310,066  
8   1,503,025    1,504,076    [988,494]    [981,992]    448,207    441,703  
9   1,689,203    1,674,053    [1,122,411]    [1,115,649]    640,830    635,389  
Richest   2,169,523    2,052,289    [1,475,540]    [1,381,991]    1,035,514    959,156  
Note: In pounds. Sample size is: 967 couples, 308 single men, 655 single women. Square brackets indicate 
statistics are based on a small sample (of only 30 or 31 individuals). 
 
Table A.2 Mean and median lifetime earnings by quintile of lifetime earnings 
  Couples  Single men  Single women 
Quintiles  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Poorest   603,594    673,200    264,050   286,411    1,847    18  
2   1,010,228    1,013,210    608,293    606,877    71,173    66,588  
3   1,209,382    1,208,118    787,962    785,953    199,568    192,524  
4   1,437,269    1,433,253    948,636    935,267    381,123    374,594  
Richest   1,928,119    1,827,883    1,296,081    1,213,008    836,666    785,392  
Note: In pounds. Sample size is: 967 couples, 308 single men, 655 single women. 
 
Table A.3 Share reporting zero net housing wealth by quintile of lifetime earnings 
Quintiles  Couples  Single men  Single women 
Poorest  40%  66%  51% 
2  17%  53%  53% 
3  9%  54%  34% 
4  7%  24%  32% 
Richest  2%  15%  16% 
All  15%  43%  37% 
Note: Sample size is: 967 couples, 308 single men, 655 single women. 
 
Table A.4 Years contracted-out by deciles of lifetime earnings (couples) 








As a share of years with 
earnings 
Poorest  2.55  0.21  1.43  0.16 
2  7.84  0.43  1.70  0.15 
3  9.13  0.47  2.93  0.19 
4  10.45  0.51  2.47  0.18 
5  10.05  0.51  3.73  0.24 
6  11.91  0.57  3.44  0.20 
7  11.59  0.56  3.80  0.22 54 
 
8  13.38  0.59  6.85  0.37 
9  13.20  0.63  8.03  0.43 
Richest  13.33  0.63  11.04  0.58 
Note: In pounds. Sample size is 967. 
 
Table A.5 Years contracted-out by deciles of lifetime earnings (singles) 








As a share of years 
with earnings 
Poorest  2.26  0.17  0.11  0.06 
2  5.31  0.33  0.96  0.10 
3  10.02  0.54  2.49  0.18 
4  10.19  0.55  6.56  0.40 
Richest  11.26  0.58  10.15  0.58 
Note: Sample size is: 308 single men, 655 single women. 
 
Table A.6 Regression of total net wealth or the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings 
on lifetime earnings and other characteristics: single women 
  (1)  (2) 
Total net wealth  Ratio of wealth to 
lifetime earnings 
Lifetime earnings  0.0791**  –178.4** 
  (0.0241)  (67.87) 
Age  –4.699***  12.75 
  (1.039)  (28.52) 
No children  –19.65  41.15 
  (13.85)  (380.1) 
Own occupier  114.6***  550.9* 
  (9.771)  (272.3) 
Own occupier in London or South East  85.12***  –9.170 
  (19.33)  (532.9) 
In London or SE  8.064  67.68 
  (14.98)  (413.7) 
Some class 2 contributions  –21.03  –568.0 
  (25.35)  (716.8) 
Divorced  –7.210  299.8 
  (18.21)  (509.2) 
Widowed  –32.67  33.04 
  (18.77)  (523.8) 
With qualification above A-level  66.63***  158.7 
  (13.03)  (364.8) 
In fair/poor health  –18.88*  –318.0 
  (9.420)  (262.2) 
>=75% chance living for 10 to 15 years  24.35**  –13.62 
  (9.280)  (255.7) 
With high numeracy  7.300  –36.74 
  (10.01)  (276.9) 
Number of years with reduced rate  –1.996**  –63.12** 
  (0.769)  (21.26) 55 
 
With credits between 16 and 49  –14.14  –230.5 
  (10.68)  (296.3) 
With credits between 50 and 59  –17.68  –372.9 
  (9.498)  (264.7) 
Whether contracted out  11.66  –128.0 
  (9.484)  (263.7) 
N  521  521 
adj. R2  0.28  0.04 
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
Notes: In specification (1), the dependant variable is total net wealth and the estimator is a median 
regression. Lifetime earnings and total wealth are expressed in thousand pounds. In specification (2), the 
dependant variable is the ratio of total net wealth over lifetime earnings and the estimation is done using 
OLS. The sample excludes single women in the lowest and highest decile of lifetime earnings distribution 
as well as those with more than 5 years of class 2 NI contributions. 
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Figure A.1. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of housing wealth, by 
lifetime earnings decile – couples  
 
 
Note: Sample size = 967; one observation per couple. 
 
Figure A.2. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of non-housing wealth, by 
lifetime earnings decile – couples 
 
Note: Sample size = 967; one observation per couple. 















































































Figure A.3. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of housing wealth, by 
lifetime earnings quintile – single men 
 
 
Note: Sample size = 308.  
 
Figure A.4. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of non-housing wealth, by 
lifetime earnings quintile – single men 
 
Note: Sample size = 308. 













































































Figure A.5. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of housing wealth, by 
lifetime earnings quintile – single women 
 
 
Note: Sample size = 655.  
 
Figure A.6. 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of non-housing wealth, by 
lifetime earnings quintile – single women 
 
Note: Sample size = 655.  
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